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Show Me the Money?: Washington Adopts the Cost
Prohibitive Defense to Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer Contracts
Merryn B. DeBenedetti*
When one has been threatened with a great injustice, one accepts a
smaller as a favour.
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has rapidly become a preferred method of resolving
disputes. The American Arbitration Association ("AAA") alone
handled 230,255 cases in the last year, a figure representing over
eleven percent of all the cases handled since 1926.2 Since 1926, the
AAA has administered over two million cases.' Proponents of
arbitration often tout its efficiency and its ability to conserve judicial
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1. JANE WELSH CARLYLE, LETTERS AND MEMORIALS, entry for Nov. 21, 1855 (1883),
in THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 281 (John Daintith et al. eds., 1989).
2. Statistics regarding the volume of arbitrations conducted by the AAA are from the AAA
website, at http://www.adr.org (last visited March 1, 2004). The AAA is the leading national
arbitrator and provides the best baseline for examining the protocols and rules associated with
arbitration in the United States.
3. Id.
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resources. 4 Nevertheless, arbitration may not provide some consumers
these intended benefits when used by commercial entities in consumer
contracts to prevent claims alleging the sale of defective goods and the
use of improper financing practices.
In Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. Wilder,5 the attorney for
the consumers contesting the arbitration clause at issue wrote: "The
vigorous assertions of Appellant notwithstanding, the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA")6 is not some all-encompassing panacea for
litigation; to be blindly invoked and rotely applied simply because it
has been incorporated into a consumer contract."' 7  Although the
legislative history surrounding the FAA suggests that this assertion is
entirely accurate, commercial entities regularly misuse arbitration
clauses to preclude consumer disputes from reaching a judicial forum,
as the following hypothetical scenario illustrates.
Bobby Turner is a twenty-nine-year-old entry-level carpenter for
a construction company doing business in Eastern Washington.
Although he shows talent in his chosen vocation, he does not earn very
much money because he is an apprentice, and his employment is
seasonal. Emily, his twenty-eight-year-old wife, draws social security
disability because she suffers from chronic fatigue syndrome and
hypertension. Emily's monthly social security disability check
contributes $600 to the family's income. The Turners have two
children under the age of ten and receive an additional $400 per month
for the two children from social security disability.
The Turners currently rent a small, two-bedroom house just
beyond the town's city limits. Although money is tight, especially
with two children, Bobby and Emily want to own their own home.
However, after looking at a couple of houses with a real estate agent,
the Turners realize that they cannot afford a conventional home. On
their way home from another disappointing meeting with the real
estate agent, the Turners stop off at the local mobile home dealer after
seeing a large plastic banner and balloons proclaiming "Special
Financing for First Time Buyers." If nothing else, they believe that
they might be able to buy a mobile home and put it behind the home
of Emily's parents, who own a five-acre tract of land out in the county.
The mobile home salesman, anxious to meet his monthly sales quota,
initially shows them a double-wide model with a dealer price of
$65,000 before determining that the Turners can only afford a small
4. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
5. 47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. App. 2001).
6. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1999).
7. Brief of Appellee at 5, Conseco, 47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. App. 2001).
[Vol. 27:899
Cost Prohibitive Defense to Arbitration
three-bedroom, two-bath single-wide home with a price tag of
$35,000. When the Turners try to negotiate a better price, the
salesman tells them that this price includes all appliances, as well as a
master bedroom suite and a living room suite.
The Turners are excited. The appliances are new and shiny, and
they get to pick from several styles of furniture in the dealer office,
which doubles as a small showroom. While Emily is choosing her
carpet from several samples, Bobby asks the salesman about
installation of the mobile home and some problems he saw in the
interior wood trim. The salesman assures Bobby that the dealer's
installation crew is one of the best in the area and that any small
"cosmetic" interior problems will be fixed after delivery to the
Turner's satisfaction. The salesman tells the Turners that the mobile
home comes with a one-year warranty from the manufacturer and the
dealer. Having been reassured, the Turners sign a purchase
agreement and a loan application. Disappearing for a half-hour, the
salesman returns and tells the Turners that his finance manager will
not send in the application unless they can make a $5000 down
payment or put up a tract of land as collateral to secure payment of the
loan. The salesman asks the Turners to talk with Emily's parents
about sub-dividing their tract and deeding them one acre of their own.
He also tells them that a co-signor on the note or a small down
payment of $1000 would guarantee that the deal would go through.
The Turners agree to talk to Emily's parents and, after much
discussion, call the salesman the next day and tell him that her parents
will deed them a one-acre tract and will loan them $1000 for a partial
down payment. The Turners meet with the salesman and the finance
manager approximately ten days later with a new deed and $1000 to
sign the documents for the purchase of their new home. Within the
fifty pages of closing documents are approximately twenty-five places
for the Turners to sign or initial. The salesman makes it easy for them
to wade through the morass of paperwork, pointing out where they
need to sign or initial and telling them that their new home is being
manufactured right now and should be ready for delivery in
approximately thirty days. An hour later, the Turners emerge with a
copy of all of their paperwork. Upon arriving home, they promptly
put it in a box that they will read later after going to her parent's house
to look at their new tract of land.
Later, Bobby briefly reviews some of the paperwork and is
reassured to discover that their mortgage company, a national
corporation specializing in financing mobile homes, will conduct a
telephone audit after delivery of the mobile home to ensure that they
2004]
Seattle University Law Review
have accepted delivery of their home. The Turners and Emily's
parents spend the next four weekends doing their own site
preparation. Shortly thereafter, the dealer's site installation crew
arrives and installs the footers, followed three days later by their new
mobile home. After the mobile home is installed, the Turners
discover that most of the doors and windows are difficult to open and
close and some windows will not open at all. During the telephone
audit, Bobby mentions this to the mortgage representative, who
assures him that these issues are covered by his warranty, and that he
should immediately contact his dealer. After obtaining his recorded
acceptance of the mobile home, the mortgage representative
congratulates him on his purchase of a new home and reminds him
that that his monthly mortgage payment must be made in a timely
manner.
Over the next ten months, the Turners are unable to get the
windows and doors repaired in addition to a leak that has developed in
the wall in the master bedroom. The dealer tells them that the issues
with the windows and doors are a manufacturer's problem and not an
installation problem. When the manufacturer's local repair
representative arrives, however, he informs the Turners that the home
is not set up "right." Frustrated, the Turners begin taking turns
calling the dealer, getting no response; calling the manufacturer, which
tells them that it has made its repairs; and finally, calling the mortgage
company, which tells them that it simply bought their contract and
has no obligation to make any repairs. In addition, the mortgage
company informs the Turners that they were late with their last
monthly payment. In this call, Bobby tells this particular
representative that he is not going to pay for a defective mobile home,
and that he is going to see a lawyer. The representative tells Bobby
that he had better read his contract again and hangs up.
Later, the Turners decide to visit a lawyer in town with all of
their paperwork. After listening patiently to the Turners' story and
reviewing their contract, the lawyer finally says that they cannot sue
anyone, other than the manufacturer, because their contract contains
an arbitration clause that they signed. Bobby Turner asks what that
means, and the lawyer simply shakes her head and sighs.
Although this is only a hypothetical scenario, it is representative
of the predatory manufacturing and financing tactics that some
commercial entities employ and the use of arbitration clauses to avoid
costly consumer claims that result from defective and rapacious
manufacturing, sale, and financing practices. The Turners' situation
is not unique. Manufacturers, dealers, and commercial financing
[Vol. 27:899
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institutions often bury arbitration clauses in fine print as a method to
preclude a consumer from pursuing his or her claim, even though the
sold goods are defective or the financing methods and lack of
disclosure are reprehensible. Courts continue to struggle with whether
arbitration is a comparable forum to litigation to protect consumer
rights, and some courts have attempted to delineate new exceptions to
the presumption in favor of arbitration in order to address these sharp
business practices.8
In commercial-consumer contracts, arbitration may well be
incapable of protecting consumers to the extent that litigation can
create consumer awareness regarding defective products and predatory
lending practices, assist in regulating these business practices in our
market economy, preserve consumer choice regarding whether to
arbitrate or litigate statutory claims, and protect consumers from
economic harm.
Some courts have adopted a new exception to invalidate
agreements to arbitrate: a prohibitive cost defense. If the consumer
can demonstrate that the arbitral forum is economically inaccessible,
courts will permit that consumer to litigate, rather than arbitrate, his
or her claims under the contract. Such exceptions, however, may
prove to be more troublesome than beneficial to consumer interests.
In Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes,9 the Washington Court of
Appeals recently recognized that arbitration should not be rotely
applied to every consumer contract, notwithstanding the existence of a
clause in the contract whereby the parties agreed to arbitrate their
disputes.1" The court adopted a legal and equitable cost prohibitive
defense with respect to mandatory arbitration agreements." Like the
hypothetical scenario discussed above, Mendez involved a mobile
home sale to a low-income consumer who was unable to afford the
costs of arbitration to bring his claims. 2
Although Washington courts presume arbitration agreements to
be enforceable, 3 the adoption of the cost prohibitive defense to
8. See Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, 1il Wash. App. 446, 45 P.3d 594 (2002); Conseco,
47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. App. 2001); In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001).
9. 111 Wash. App. 446,45 P.3d 594 (2002).
10. Id. at 464, 45 P.3d at 604.
11. Id. at 450, 45 P.3d at 597.
12. Id.
13. E.g., id. at 458, 45 P.3d at 601 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 7.04.010, which provides
that arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for
the revocation of any agreement").
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mandatory arbitration agreements may allow consumers of limited
means and in certain circumstances to find their way into a courtroom
and litigate their disputes with businesses. The adoption of the cost
prohibitive defense may provide some relief to consumers who wish to
litigate, rather than arbitrate, their claims; however, it is not an
adequate remedy for the problems associated with arbitration.
Despite Washington courts' sympathy for low-income consumers,
several inherent problems with the cost prohibitive defense defeat its
purposes and undermine its usefulness in the consumer context.
First, the cost prohibitive defense places the burden on the
consumer to prove that arbitration presents an insurmountable
financial barrier to bringing his or her claims. Second, the cost
prohibitive defense requires an evidentiary hearing to determine if
arbitration is indeed cost prohibitive for a particular plaintiff. This
evidentiary inquiry likely will further increase, rather than decrease,
costs to consumers and produce inefficiency in the resolution of
claims. Because arbitration is meant to counteract inefficiency, any
method of avoiding arbitration that produces inefficiency undercuts
the policies behind alternative dispute resolution. Third, the cost
prohibitive defense fails to address inherent problems of adhesive
contracts, such as the lack of informed consent and lack of consensual
bargained-for exchange. Instead, the defense continues to protect
commercial interests, rather than consumers, by providing only a
narrow exception to the presumption in favor of arbitration. Finally,
the cost prohibitive defense, as applied by the courts, offers no
definitive standard by which potential litigants can measure their
likelihood of success in surviving a motion to stay litigation and
compel arbitration. This lack of guidance for future litigants also
invites the use of this defense in varying contexts-where parties may
well be on essentially equal bargaining terms-in order to avoid
arbitration. For the foregoing reasons, any potential benefits gained
by allowing plaintiffs to demonstrate prohibitive costs as a defense to
mandatory arbitration agreements clearly come at a significant cost
because successfully asserting this defense requires expense and time
and ignores the issue of unconscionability in the contract itself
entirely. By virtue of the FAA and with an unwillingness to invalidate
adhesive arbitration clauses as unconscionable, courts have failed to
protect consumer interests in commercial settings. The cost
prohibitive defense, although attempting to protect citizens who are
less fortunate from an economic standpoint, does not adequately
correct that failure.
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Many commentators have argued that mandatory arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts unfairly preclude those consumers from
pursuing their claims.14 The scope of this Note, however, focuses on
whether the courts have adequately corrected the substantive failures
of mandatory arbitration agreements when they permit consumers to
prove prohibitive costs.
Following this Introduction, Part II of this Note explores the
origin and history behind the adoption of the FAA and the legislative
desire to place parties of equal bargaining power in a position to
arbitrate. Part III examines the acceptance of this defense in other
jurisdictions. Part IV considers the Mendez case and analyzes
Washington's newly adopted approach to invalidate mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Part V illustrates the
appropriateness of this defense and addresses the benefits and burdens
of applying it in the consumer context. Part VI concludes the Note,
identifying the unjustified presumptions that undercut the value of
arbitration as an alternative forum to resolve disputes in the consumer
context and evaluating the cost prohibitive defense as an adequate
response.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE FAA AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE COST PROHIBITIVE DEFENSE
Section A of this part examines the FAA, provides the
justifications for its adoption, and considers the practical effects of
binding arbitration agreements in the consumer context. Section B
outlines Washington's arbitration statute. Section C discusses the
Supreme Court's Green Tree decision, suggesting that the cost
prohibitive defense may be available in some consumer cases.
A. Equal Bargaining Power and the Federal Arbitration Act
The FAA was initially enacted in 1925."5 Section 2 of the FAA,
which addresses the validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of
arbitration agreements, states:
14. See discussion infra section II.A.
15. 43 Stat. 883 (1925). The FAA was reenacted and recodified in 1947 as Title 9 of the
United States Code. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1947). See also Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1244
(2001) (noting that the provisions of the FAA are meant to counteract a longstanding judicial
hostility toward arbitration agreements and, consequently, they suggest a liberal enforcement
policy with regard to mandatory arbitration agreements); Rita M. Cain, Commercial Disputes and
Compulsory Arbitration, 44 Bus. LAW 65 (1988) (discussing the enactment of the FAA and the
purposes behind its adoption, including reversal of the common law rule that either party could
2004]
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
16
The stated purpose of section 2 of the FAA is a "congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary.' 1 7 Notably, this purpose was only meant to place arbitration
agreements on the same footing as other traditional contracts, not to
eliminate fundamental access rights to the judicial forum.18
Traditional contract theory presumes that contracts result from a
bargained-for exchange by parties on equal footing. 9 Doctrines such
revoke a pre-dispute arbitration agreement because the purpose of pre-dispute arbitration was to
oust the jurisdiction of the courts).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999); see also Duplan Corp. v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F.
Supp. 86 (1977) (concluding that Congress intended 9 U.S.C. § 2 "only to place arbitration
agreements affecting commerce or maritime affairs on the same footing as other contracts").
Common contract defenses resulting in revocation include: mistake, duress, incapacity, fraud,
and unconscionability. Such defenses may be used to invalidate arbitration agreements without
"contravening § 2 [of the FAA].)" Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
Notably, however, these defenses are generally recognized as narrow in scope and inconsistently
applied in different jurisdictions, and consumers cannot place much reliance in these doctrines to
escape mandatory arbitration clauses. Many cases alleging fraud and other contractual defects
illustrate this point. See Saneii v. Robards, 187 F. Supp. 2d 710, 711 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (holding
the buyers must arbitrate their claim that sellers fraudulently induced sale of house because the
allegation of fraud is to the contract generally and not the arbitration clause itself); Lawrence v.
Comprehensive Business Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting argument
that arbitration is prohibited because illegality of contract is a ground which "[exists] at law or
equity for the revocation of any contract"). But cf Hayes Children Leasing Co. v. NCR Corp.,
37 Cal. App. 4th 775 (1995) (denying petition to compel arbitration where arbitration clause
itself fraudulently induced).
17. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also
Alderman, supra note 15, at 1244; Cain, supra note 15, at 66; Jason Bradley Kay, Note, The Post-
Green Tree Evidentiary Standard for Invalidating Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Lending
Contracts: How Much Justice Can You Afford?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 545, 545 (2002) (arguing
that the right to trial by jury, a liberty secured by the United States Constitution, has been
qualified by the enactment of the FAA in 1925).
18. See discussion supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 15, at 1247-48; see also James J. White, Autistic
Contracts, in PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW 158 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 2001) (arguing
that the benefits of adhesive, or "autistic" contracts, including the reduction in transactional
costs, outweigh the costs imposed on "dissenting offerees"). However, if a single contract
controls a large quantity of costs or services, the adhesive contract system is unlikely to be more
efficient. See id. For a comprehensive review on the theory and application of the doctrine of
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as unconscionability bolster this premise, because if a contract results
from procedural or substantive unfair advantages held by one party,
courts may void the contract. The FAA was designed in part to
encourage courts to find arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contracts in order to overcome the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration as an ouster of jurisdiction.20 The FAA establishes that an
arbitration agreement is binding if (1) the arbitration agreement exists,
(2) the arbitration agreement is in writing, and (3) the parties
consented to the agreement. 21  The FAA has proven influential in
courts' decisions to enforce arbitration clauses, and large commercial
interests employ the FAA to stay litigation.22
When the FAA was adopted in 1925, there were few transactions
between commercial entities and consumers.23 During the debate
surrounding its adoption, one U.S. congressman raised his concern
that arbitration clauses might be placed in adhesive contracts. He was
reassured, however, by the FAA's supporters that it was not intended
to cover such situations.24 Senator Walsh from Montana, troubled by
the FAA's potential application to adhesive consumer contracts, 5
argued:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these
contracts that are entered into are really not voluntarily [sic]
things at all. Take an insurance policy; there is a blank in it.
You can take that or you can leave it. The agent has no power at
all to decide it. Either you can make that contract or you can not
make any contract. It is the same with a good many contracts of
employment. A man says "These are our terms. All right, take
it or leave it." Well, there is nothing for a man to do except to
sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by
the court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he
has no confidence at all.26
unconscionability, see generally RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS CASES AND DOCTRINES
1130-1161 (2d ed. 1999).
20. Alderman, supra note 15, at 1244.
21. See id. at 1246.
22. Shelly Smith, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts:
Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191,
1193-94 (2001).
23. Jean K. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 647 (1996).
24. Id.
25. Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 1923, quoted in Linda Alle-Murphy, Comment, Are
Compulsory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts Enforceable? A Contractual Analysis, 75
TEMP. L. REV. 125,138 (2002).
26. Id. For further review of the Senate debates surrounding the adoption of the FAA, see
Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial
2004]
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In response, Senator Platt, Chairman of the ABA Committee on
Commerce, Trade, and Commercial law, reassured Senator Walsh
that the proposed FAA was not intended to cover insurance contracts,
or any other kind of legislation, that would "force a man to sign that
kind of contract. "27 The legislative intent of the FAA clearly indicates
that arbitration clauses in adhesive consumer contracts were not
originally within the purview of the statute because this concern was
specifically raised during floor debates and dismissed by the FAA's
proponents as inapplicable.
Seventy-six years later, in May 2001, Dudley Butler, an attorney
from Mississippi, testified before the Senate Appropriations Sub-
Committee on Agriculture regarding adhesive agreements to arbitrate
in the poultry industry.2' He argued that while arbitration "is a
valuable alternative resolution procedure," arbitration clauses that
waive any right to a jury trial and contain "cost laden" provisions take
away the "litigation forum ... by contract and the arbitration
forum... by economics. ' '  He posits that "the use of mandatory
arbitration clauses along with the waiver of any right to a jury trial is
in fact counterproductive to the promotion of the arbitration process"
because the arbitration process essentially functions as a "cost
controlling liability reduction device," rather than a "dispute
resolution device."3 He proposed that Congress amend the FAA to
mandate that the individual or entity can choose the forum at the time
a claim is made.3
Arbitration clearly has become fraught with inefficiencies and
inequity from the time when Congress enacted the FAA to today.
Commentators like Mr. Butler condemn the use of mandatory
arbitration clauses in certain kinds of contracts and argue that the
FAA must be amended or, alternatively, courts should cease to give
agreements to arbitrate such expansive deference.
In addition to the distinction that the 1925 Congress made
between consumer-commercial transactions and arm's length business
transactions, the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the
FAA also suggests its narrow jurisdictional application. The FAA
was intended to govern disputes regarding arbitration in federal
Arbitration: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, S. 4213 and S. 4214, 67th
Cong. 9 (1923).
27. Alle-Murphy, supra note 25, at 138.
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courts, not in state courts.3 2 This congressional intention is bolstered
by the fact that proponents of the FAA were simultaneously working
on similar state laws that would have been "superfluous" had the FAA
been intended to govern state courts:
The Supreme Court introduced an expansive reading of the FAA
for the first time in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction.4 The dispute in Moses H. Cone arose when a hospital
entered into a contract with a contractor to build additions to the
hospital building.3" The contract provided that the parties could
arbitrate disputes either decided by the architect or not decided within
a specified time.36 The contractor submitted claims to the architect for
extended overhead and increased construction costs due to the
hospital's delay. 37 The hospital refused to pay the claims and filed an
action seeking a declaratory judgment stating that, inter alia, the
contractor had no right to arbitration. 8 The case eventually reached
the United States Supreme Court.39
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, declared that "[t]he
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration."4 Justice Brennan relied on Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Corp.4 Although Prima Paint extended only to
the specific issue presented, 42 Justice Brennan noted in Moses H. Cone
32. Id. at 649.
33. Id. at 649-50.
34. Id. at 660; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983);
see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (noting that section 2 of the FAA is a
congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, and
Congress, by enacting section 2, has withdrawn from the states the power to require a judicial
forum for resolution of claims which the parties agreed to resolve by arbitration). Although the
FAA was not intended to supersede state law, states are prevented from requiring the judicial
resolution of claims. This policy may raise a federalism issue outside the scope of this Note;
nevertheless, states which choose to provide more protections for their consumers than
arbitration currently allows should be able to do so.





40. Id. at 24-25.
41. Id. at 24; Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Prima
Paint involved a contract containing an arbitration clause where one party alleged that the
contract had been fraudulently induced. Id. The issue before the Court was whether fraud in
the contractual exchange was itself an arbitrable controversy. Id. at 402. The Court held that
the language and policy behind the FAA rendered the fraud issue also arbitrable. Id. at 402-04.
42. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04; Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
2004]
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that "the courts of appeals have since consistently concluded that
questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration."43 In this context, the Supreme
Court's subsequent decisions "can be seen as expressing a law and
economics philosophy favoring the alienability of court access
rights.",
The problem with the Court's interpretation regarding
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts, however, is that a stay
of litigation may result in a complete stay of the dispute because
consumers traditionally are less willing to arbitrate disputes than to
litigate a claim in a jury trial.4" This unwillingness of potential
plaintiffs to arbitrate disputes allows commercial interests to
effectively use arbitration to avoid consumer lawsuits.46
Arbitration has its benefits. As one author has noted, its
proponents regularly assert the following: arbitration provides
efficiency and greater flexibility.47  Moreover, parties with equal
bargaining power may reduce transactional costs by agreeing in
advance to arbitrate disputes.48 To some extent, the traditional
judicial forum has proven inadequate to resolve disputes,49 and the
FAA was Congress's response, designed to relieve an overburdened
judicial system.5" Because the burden on the judicial system
historically increases from year to year, Congress created the FAA to
reduce the costs of dispute resolution, and to encourage parties to
43. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
44. Sternlight, supra note 23, at 674.
45. Smith, supra note 22, at 1194.
46. Id. at 1195.
47. See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 15, at 1239.
48. Smith, supra note 22, at 1191; see also Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act:
The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis and a Proposal for Change,
53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 826 (2002) (arguing that the supporters and drafters of the FAA
"envisioned arbitration agreements between merchants, and not arbitration of issues arising from
consumer contracts"). Moreover, the floor debates over the FAA suggest that the FAA was not
intended to be applicable to adhesion contracts that powerful commercial interests force upon
consumers. Id.
49. Alderman, supra note 15, at 1267-68. Professor Alderman contends that the
"underlying premise of ADR rhetoric [is] simple: the legal system had become too expensive, too
slow, and too inefficient to deal with the myriad of problems it was being asked to resolve." Id.
at 1238. Consequently, from a philosophical perspective, there is little fault with the concept of
ADR. Id. at 1239. However, it is apparent that the realities of pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration as employed in consumer transactions "differ sharply from the idealized process" that
ADR was meant to achieve because consumers rarely choose pre-dispute arbitration, as it is
usually imposed upon the consumer in an adhesion contract. Id. at 1240.
50. See Smith, supra note 22, at 1191. Arbitration was initially created so that parties with
equal bargaining power could reduce the costs of litigation by agreeing to submit their disputes to
arbitration. Id.
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salvage contractual relationships." Prior to the enactment of the
FAA, courts would allow two parties to submit a dispute to binding
arbitration, but rarely enforced a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
52
The FAA was primarily envisioned, therefore, as applying to
consensual transactions between parties with equal bargaining power,
not necessarily applying to transactions between consumers and
commercial entities.5 3 Initial Supreme Court decisions consistently
applied the principle that arbitration involved voluntary and
consensual parties. 4
Such benefits notwithstanding, arbitration has not been an
adequate remedy to the burdens and costs associated with litigation.
While some consumers may prefer the asserted benefits of arbitration,
including prompt and efficient resolutions of their claims, 5 arbitration
lacks many protections and safeguards for consumer rights, 6 such as
developing common law in an open forum by virtue of a jury trial.
The prompt and inexpensive resolution of claims should never take
precedence over consumer protections and safeguards that manifest in
a lay jury because the justice system's primary concern should not
focus solely on efficiency and expense.
Because arbitration emphasizes efficiency and lowered
transactional costs, powerful commercial parties are often able to
mislead less powerful consumers into agreements to arbitrate by
burying arbitration clauses in complicated and lengthy documents.
7
Consumers are less likely to realize any inherent efficiency benefits
resulting in lowered transactional costs when they waive their right to
litigate a claim; they are giving up that right in favor of lower
transactional costs that substantially benefit only the commercial
entity.58  In the most egregious cases, commercial interests insert
51. See id. at 1220; see also Pittman, supra note 48, at 828.
52. Sternlight, supra note 23, at 644.
53. Seeid. at 647.
54. See id.
55. Alderman, supra note 15, at 1239-40.
56. See Smith, supra note 22, at 1222 ("Mandatory arbitration effectively strips consumers
of their rights to protect themselves from large corporations and jeopardizes the American
judicial process of developing common law.").
57. Id. at 1192.
58. Id. Although it may well be that mandatory arbitration clauses lower transactional
costs, thereby helping the consumer because those savings are passed through to the consumer,
the fact that mandatory arbitration agreements in consumer contracts often function as a bar to
the consumer's claim may suggest that the commercial entity likely receives the most benefit
because consumers are prevented from bringing their claims at all. Thus, it is not merely that
the good or service may cost less because of the existence of the arbitration, but rather that the
insertion of the arbitration clause in an adhesive consumer contract allows the commercial entity
to sell goods or services without recourse for defects, illegal or improper financing, and other
sharp business practices.
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unilateral clauses in arbitration agreements whereby one party retains
the right to choose between arbitrating and litigating certain disputes
whereas the other party must arbitrate all claims. 9
Viewing the issue in this context, mandatory arbitration clauses
are detrimental to consumer rights rather than an alternative and
efficient forum to resolve disputes as intended by the FAA, both
legislatively and as a matter of public policy.6" Consequently, "[t]he
notion that arbitration is 'merely' a different forum is a myth, just like
the belief that the world was flat or that the sun revolved around the
earth."61  Because the FAA encourages a liberal enforcement policy
regarding arbitration and because courts are reluctant to disturb
contractual bargains, consumers retain no viable judicial alternatives
or remedies other than to proceed to mandatory arbitration.62 The
FAA's liberal policy toward arbitration and the judiciary's reluctance
to invalidate adhesive arbitration clauses also fundamentally
jeopardizes the judicial process of common law development because
arbitration typically is not an open forum with published decisions
and spectators.63
These considerations suggest that arbitration clauses should
never be blindly upheld, despite the potential benefits gained by
efficiency and lowered transactional expense. Courts mistakenly
embrace arbitration agreements as a philosophically comparable
solution to litigation even though such agreements are often injurious
to consumer rights. One author suggests that the four major policy
arguments in support of a judicial preference for binding arbitration
are substantially unjustified in light of the imposition of "unregulable
arbitration on nonconsenting consumers and other little guys."'64 Such
pro-arbitration arguments include the notion that two parties should
59. Adam M. Nahmias, The Enforceability of Contract Clauses Giving One Party the
Unilateral Right to Choose Between Arbitration and Litigation, 21 CONSTR. LAWYER 36 (2001).
60. See Alderman, supra note 15, at 1267; see also Andrew J. Sarapas, Comment, Amending
Maine's Plain Language Law to Ensure Complete Disclosure to Consumers Signing Arbitration
Contracts, 50 ME. L. REV. 83, 117 (1998) (arguing that arbitrators, as business people or
attorneys, are not only less likely to award punitive damages, but that commercial interests rely
on arbitration agreements to avoid sympathetic juries composed of consumers).
61. Alderman, supra note 15, at 1264; see also Sternlight, supra note 23, at 641. Ms.
Sternlight commented:
When Congress passed the FAA in 1925, it intended only to require federal courts to
accept arbitration agreements that had been voluntarily entered into by two parties of
relatively equal bargaining power in arms' length transactions. Congress did not
intend to enforce arbitration agreements that had been foisted on ignorant consumers,
and it did not intend to prevent states from protecting weaker parties.
Id.
62. See Alderman, supra note 15, at 1264.
63. Smith, supra note 22, at 1222.
64. Sternlight, supra note 23, at 674-75.
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retain the freedom to contract as they see fit.65 Another argument is
that the benefits of arbitration outweigh the harms of non-consensual
transactions. 66 A third argument is that the market has an inherent
ability to correct itself with regard to commercial entities that misuse
arbitration and that the harm levied against a few individuals is small
compared to the overwhelming benefits of arbitration Like other
states, the Washington legislature and Washington courts have
approached agreements to arbitrate with favor, even in adhesive
consumer contracts.
B. Presumed Valid: Washington's Approach to Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses
Washington State courts have become enamored by the
"efficiency and economics" aspects of binding arbitration and
continue to overlook the substantive unfairness in unilaterally forcing
consumers to forego remedies in the judicial forum. Court
enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses in the consumer context
furthers the ability of commercial interests to deal in sharp business
practices without recourse in a jury setting. Juries would likely view
rapacious business practices suspiciously and punish commercial
entities accordingly. Like its federal counterpart, Washington State
recognizes arbitration agreements as enforceable. According to
Washington statute:
Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to
arbitration, in conformity with the provisions of this chapter,
any controversy which may be the subject of 'n action existing
65. Seeid.at 675.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 674. In discrediting the theories regarding the policy justifications for binding
arbitration, Ms. Sternlight suggests that freedom of contract cannot ". . . realistically be used to
justify imposing binding arbitration through contracts of adhesion on unwitting consumers"
because "[flew, if any, would be foolish enough to argue that most employees and consumers
actually read and understand the form contracts that they sign which commit them to binding
arbitration." Id. at 676. Moreover, Ms. Sternlight rightly asserts that the "fiscal savings to
courts from diverting cases from trial may be outweighed by the costs of running an efficient
ADR program, and savings in lawyer time are often modest and not necessarily passed on to
litigants through lower legal fees." Id. at 679. Ms. Sternlight suggests three arguments that
undermine the economically based assertion that arbitration is an adequate response to litigation:
(1) procedure determines substantive outcome, (2) the party drafting an agreement maximizes
that agreement's provisions to its own advantage, and (3) market competition will not prevent
commercial entities from taking advantage of less powerful parties. Id. at 675-693. The crux of
the argument against binding arbitration agreements in consumer contracts extends beyond
whether a particular method of commercial exchange is "Pareto optimal." See id. at 677. Rather,
the most important consideration is that consumers should not be forced to forego a judicial
remedy based upon an unconscionably drafted agreement by parties on unequal footing despite
particular economic or commercial advantages offered by arbitration. See id.
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between them at the time of the agreement to submit, or they
may include in a written agreement a provision to settle by
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between them out
of or in relation to such agreement. Such agreement shall be
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable save upon such grounds as
exist in law or equity for the revocation of any agreement."
If a contract executed in Washington provides for the arbitration
of disputes, a plaintiff cannot maintain an action without first
submitting to arbitration.69 Washington courts generally refuse to
intervene in the arbitration process because public policy and the
statutory scheme suggest a narrow approach to construing the
exceptions to the arbitration statute.7" To stay legal action, a court
simply must find the arbitration clause valid as well as the dispute
referable to arbitration under the agreement.71 Notably, the terms of
the parties' agreement govern the power and method of the arbitrators
and govern who will bear costs." Following in the footsteps of federal
courts, Washington courts also initially recognized a strong public
policy favoring arbitration and adopted a "narrow approach" to
intervening in the arbitration process.
C. The Emergence of the Cost Prohibitive Defense to Mandatory
Arbitration: Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph,74 the U.S. Supreme
Court entered the fray over the validity of mandatory arbitration
clauses in adhesive consumer contracts.7" The Court addressed the
possibility that a mandatory arbitration clause in an adhesive
consumer contract may pose significant barriers to plaintiffs who
desire to vindicate their statutory rights.76 While not explicitly
providing a particular standard, the Green Tree Court noted that proof
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.04.010 (2002).
69. See generally Hughes v. Bravinder, 9 Wash. 595, 38 P. 209 (1894); Wager v. Odden,
148 Wash. 188, 268 P. 151 (1928).
70. See Perez v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 85 Wash. App. 760, 934 P.2d 731 (1997).
71. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.04.030; Greenlee v. AAACON Auto. Transp., Inc., 6
Wash. App. 742, 743-44, 496 P.2d 359, 360 (1972).
72. See Hegeberg v. New England Fish Co., 7 Wash. 2d 509, 520, 110 P.2d 182, 186
(1941); see also Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Lake Wash. Shipyards, 1 Wash. 2d 401,
410, 96 P.2d 257, 261 (1939) (holding that arbitration is subject to the contract and the parties
may agree to any terms) (emphasis added).
73. Perez, 85 Wash. App. at 767, 934 P.2d at 734.
74. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 84.
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of prohibitive costs might permit a plaintiff to litigate, rather than
arbitrate, his or her claims.77
The Green Tree case arose when plaintiff Randolph purchased a
mobile home from Better Cents Home Builders Inc. in Alabama.78
Randolph financed the home through Green Tree Financial
Corporation. 9 Randolph later sued Green Tree, alleging Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA") ° violations by failing to disclose as a finance
charge the "Vendor's Single Interest" insurance requirement.
81
Randolph later amended her complaint to add a claim that Green Tree
violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by requiring her to
arbitrate her statutory causes of action.82 Green Tree filed a motion to
compel arbitration, stay the action, or dismiss Randolph's complaint.83
The district court granted Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration,
denied the motion to stay the proceedings, and dismissed Randolph's
claim with prejudice. 4 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit determined that, relative to arbitration, the Green
Tree arbitration agreement failed to provide "minimum guarantees"
that Randolph could vindicate her statutory rights with respect to her
77. Id. at 90.
78. Id. at 82.
79. Id.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1998). The Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") addresses a
congressional desire to promote disclosure to consumers regarding credit for consumer
transactions. The Congressional findings and declaration of purpose of TILA state:
(a) Informed use of credit. The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be
enhanced and the competition among the various financial institutions and other firms
engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed
use of credit. The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof
by consumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect
the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.
(b) Terms of personal property leases. The Congress also finds that there has been a
recent trend toward leasing automobiles and other durable goods for consumer use as
an alternative to installment credit sales and that these leases have been offered
without adequate cost disclosures. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a
meaningful disclosure of the terms of leases of personal property for personal, family,
or household purposes so as to enable the lessee to compare more readily the various
lease terms available to him, limit balloon payments in consumer leasing, enable
comparison of lease terms with credit terms where appropriate, and to assure
meaningful and accurate disclosures of lease terms in advertisements.
Id. As this statutory scheme suggests, TILA was meant to protect consumers from commercial
entities that take advantage of lease situations to charge exorbitant fees without disclosure to the
consumer.
81. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 83.
82. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1998).
83. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 83.
84. Id.
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allegation of TILA violations.8" The court of appeals observed that
the arbitration agreement was silent regarding payment obligations of
filing fees, arbitrator's costs, and the other arbitration expenses.86
This was the basis for the 1 1th Circuit's decision that the agreement to
arbitrate "posed a risk" that Randolph would be unable to vindicate
her statutory rights due to "steep" arbitration costs. 87  The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed."
With respect to the arbitration agreement, the Court noted that
"[i]t may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her
federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum. '"89 However, the Court
declined to provide a judicial remedy for Randolph by voiding the
arbitration agreement at issue.9" The rationale behind that decision
suggests that the Court was not persuaded that Randolph made any
factual showing that the AAA would conduct the arbitration at issue
and that, if it did, Randolph would be charged the filing fee or
arbitrator's fee.9' Because the arbitration agreement at issue was silent
on that matter, the Court found little basis to "invalidate the
agreement" and undermine the "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration."92
However, the Court's rationale in Green Tree opened the door for
consumers to allege that arbitration in the consumer context is cost
prohibitive-a defense that, as this Note discusses, has been adopted
in some state courts. The lack of guidance provided for future
plaintiffs in this regard instigated jurisdictional confusion over the
evidentiary requirement to assert this new defense. As other
commentators have noted, the Green Tree decision provided the
possibility that an arbitration clause could be deemed unenforceable
because of high costs.9" However, the Supreme Court failed to provide




89. Id. at 90.
90. Id. at 91.
91. See id.
92. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)).
93. Kay, supra note 17, at 546. The party asserting that arbitration is prohibitively
expensive bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring significant costs. However,
the Court declined to provide an evidentiary standard regarding what would be necessary to
show prohibitive costs. See id.; see also Franklin D. Romines II, Note, The Supreme Court
Defines "Final Decisions" Relating to Arbitration Decisions and Ducks the More Important "Costs"
Issue, 2001 J. DIsP. RESOL. 363, 373 (arguing that the Supreme Court's Green Tree decision did
not provide lower courts with a "scintilla" of evidence as to what constitutes prohibitive costs in
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guidance as to the evidentiary standard placed on the plaintiffs to
prove high costs and receive the opportunity to vindicate their rights
in the judicial forum.14  Consequently, courts view the type, quality,
and amount of evidence necessary to assert the cost prohibitive
defense differently. Perhaps because the Green Tree case stemmed
from a controversy regarding the purchase of a mobile home,
subsequent defective or improperly financed mobile home cases bestilluminate the success or failure of plaintiffs who assert prohibitive
costs.
III. THE COST PROHIBITIVE DEFENSE INTERPRETED IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
Different jurisdictions have interpreted the Supreme Court's
Green Tree decision regarding prohibitive costs in various ways. One
jurisdiction failed to recognize the pre-arbitration availability of the
defense at all, withholding any decision relating to prohibitive costs
until after the consumer proceeds through arbitration and provesprohibitive costs in practice." Another jurisdiction recognized that
arbitration may prove prohibitively costly, but refused to allow the
defense unless the plaintiff proved that a certain arbitrator would
conduct the arbitration and that certain costs would apply." In
contrast, the District Court for the Western District of Virginia held
that a plaintiff proved prohibitive costs by producing specific evidence
regarding her income and expenses.97 Washington also allowed the
prohibitive cost defense, although it did not require as comprehensive
an evidentiary showing.9" In the post-Green Tree setting, courts
remain divided with respect to the validity of this defense and the
proper evidentiary standard required to prove prohibitive costs.
99
the arbitral context and, consequently, the Court has "invited division among lower courts as to
what constitutes inaccessibility."). These authors predicted correctly, as various jurisdictions
have treated the availability to and burden on plaintiffs regarding this defense very differently as
the cases discussed here demonstrate.
94. Romines, supra note 93, at 363.
95. Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 343-44 (Ky. App. 2001).
96. In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex. 2001).
97. Camacho v. Holiday Homes, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 892, 895 (W.D. Va. 2001).
98. Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 111 Wash. App. 446, 450, 45 P.3d 594, 597
(2002).
99. Romines, supra note 93, at 373.
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A. Unconscionability in Practice Required: Conseco Finance Servicing
Corp. v. Wilder
Although the decision in Green Tree recognized the potential
availability of the cost prohibitive defense, courts do not necessarily
review arbitration clauses under the theory of merely potentially
prohibitive costs. For example, in Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v.
Wilder,1"' the Wilders, Kentucky residents, agreed to purchase a
mobile home from Southern Living Housing, Inc., a North Carolina
corporation with offices in Kentucky.1"' The Wilders paid $15,000
toward the purchase price of $60,000, and they agreed to pay the
remaining $45,000 balance in monthly installments) 2 The contract
signed by the Wilders was a three-page, preprinted, fill-in-the-blank
form." 3 The arbitration clause at issue was in the middle of page
three." 4 Like the hypothetical discussed in the Introduction to this
Note, the Wilders discovered numerous manufacturing, set-up, and
installation defects. They contacted the dealer and manufacturer
requesting repairs under their mobile home warranties, but to no
avail. °0 Eventually, the Wilders stopped their monthly payments,
and Green Tree filed a "Complaint to Foreclose Security Interest" in
the Bell Circuit Court, and a Writ of Possession was served on Mr.
and Mrs. Wilder.' After realizing that they had several causes of
action, both contractual and under the Kentucky Consumer Protection
Act, the Wilders filed a counter lawsuit. 7 In response, Green Tree
100. 47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. App. 2001).
101. Id. at 337.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 338.
104. Id. The arbitration clause provided:
All disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to this Contract or the
parties thereto shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by
you [seller/assignee] with my [buyers'] consent.... Notwithstanding anything
hereunto the contrary, you retain an option to use judicial (filing a lawsuit) or non-
judicial relief to enforce a security agreement relating to the Manufactured Home
secured in a transaction underlying this arbitration agreement, to enforce the
monetary obligation secured by the Manufactured Home or to foreclose on the
Manufactured Home.
Id. at 338-39. This is a prime example of a unilateral arbitration agreement whereby one party,
usually the commercial interest, retains the right to judicial and non-judicial relief, and requires
the other party, usually the consumer, to arbitrate any claims. See also Nahmias, supra note 59,
at 36 (discussing the prevalence of unilateral arbitration agreements).
105. Brief of Appellee, supra note 7, at 1.
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id. For the full text of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, see KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § § 367.110-367.370 (1972).
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moved to compel arbitration.' ° The Circuit judge entered an order
denying Green Tree's motion, and Green Tree appealed. 9
In asserting the unconscionability of the arbitration clause at
issue, the Wilders argued that the unilateral arbitration clause, which
allowed Conseco to seek judicial redress of its likeliest claims while
reserving the right to arbitrate the Wilders' claims, was oppressively
one-sided and unconscionable."' Moreover, the Wilders asserted that
Conseco maximized profits by selling defective mobile homes to low
and moderate-income consumers and subsequently refused to repair
or replace the homes-even after being ordered to do so by the
Kentucky State Fire Marshal."' In response, Conseco asked the court
to release it, its manufacturers, and its dealers from having to honor
their legal and equitable obligations in the judicial forum by
upholding the mandatory arbitration clause against the Wilders."'
The Kentucky Court of Appeals disagreed with the Wilders'
arguments."' The court concluded that arbitration is meant to
provide for expedited resolution of disputes and that the agreement
permits Conseco to litigate rather than arbitrate certain claims-
essentially claims asserting its security interest may be litigated
expeditiously." 4  The court rejected the Wilders' argument that the
arbitration clause allowing Conseco the right to litigate claims while
requiring the Wilders to submit their claims to arbitration was
"unreasonable" or "oppressive.""'  In dicta, however, the court noted
that "[s]hould it transpire, however, that the unspecified details of
Conseco's arbitration procedure prevent or unfairly hinder the
Wilders' from meaningfully presenting their case, the arbitration
clause consigning them to that procedure would appear in a different
108. Id.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Conseco, 47 S.W.3d at 342.
111. Brief of Appellee, supra note 7, at 4.
112. !d. at 4-5.
113. Conseco, 47 S.W.3d at 344.
114. See id.
115. Id. But cf. Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. II, No. C02-1635L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21761, *31 (W.D. Wa. November 4, 2002) (holding that a one-sided arbitration provision
whereby the consumer is forced to submit all claims to arbitration while the commercial interest
retains the right to judicial remedies is "one-sided in Household's [commercial interest] favor
and overly harsh to borrowers. As such, it weighs in favor of finding the Arbitration Rider
substantively unconscionable."). Household's argument on appeal failed to "address the
unfairness of this [unilateral] provision when considered in the larger context of disputes between
Household and borrowers. The Arbitration Rider preserves access to the courts ... for the only
context in which Household is likely to bring a claim against borrowers-foreclosure." Id. This
directly opposes the Conseco court's stance on a unilateral arbitration clause in a consumer
contract.
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light.""' 6  The court further stated that "[i]n that event, our ruling
today would not preclude the Wilders' from renewing their objection
to the arbitration clause in circuit court on the ground that the clause
had proved unconscionable in practice. On the record before us,
however, there is no basis for such a conclusion.""' 7 Focusing on the
fact that the Wilders failed to prove the arbitration clause
unconscionable in practice, the court relied on a ripeness argument to
conclude that the Wilders had to proceed through arbitration in order
to prove prohibitive costs.
The Wilders' brief to the Kentucky Court of Appeals reveals
that they were not sophisticated business people.118 In fact, the
Wilders' only source of income was worker's compensation benefits."1 9
Although the court suggested that the cost prohibitive defense might,
in the future, be available for litigants who prove that arbitration is
unconscionable in practice, the court left potential litigants with no
meaningful standard to apply. 2 If the defense was not available to
the Wilders, who presumably were of limited means since their only
source of income was worker's compensation benefits, the court
provided no guidance as to how unsophisticated or how indigent a
consumer would have to be in order to take advantage of the cost
prohibitive defense. 2' This may be significant because the court
essentially barred the Wilders' claims because the Wilders could not
afford to proceed through arbitration and then return to court with the
requisite proof that arbitration proved too expensive in practice.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals distinguished the amount of
proof required to assert prohibitive costs from the issue of
unconscionability at formation, and the court viewed the issue from
the standpoint of unconscionability during performance. To be
successful in avoiding the arbitration clause, the Wilders likely should
have emphasized that performance of the agreement would be
unconscionable. However, the court's dicta required the Wilders to
bring forth evidence of de facto unconscionability such as expended
costs in arbitration in order to prevail.
116. Conseco, 47 S.W.3d at 344.
117. Id.
118. Brief of Appellee, supra note 7, at 16.
119. Id. at 3.
120. Conseco, 47 S.W.3d at 344.
121. Id.
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B. The Burden to Prove Prohibitive Costs: In re FirstMerit Bank
In another defective mobile home case where a court failed to
find prohibitive costs, In re FirstMerit Bank,122 the Texas Supreme
Court also failed to provide any guidance regarding how and when it
would apply the cost prohibitive defense to mandatory arbitration
agreements. 123 Pete and Janie de los Santos purchased a mobile home
for their daughter and son-in-law from Verde Homes. 24  The de los
Santoses agreed to Verde's "Retail Installment Financing
Agreement."' 2' The agreement included an arbitration clause, which
required the parties to arbitrate "all disputes, claims, or other matters
in question arising out of or relating to this Loan, its interpretation, or
validity, performance or the breach thereof." 126 Verde subsequently
assigned the contract to FirstMerit Bank. 127 Similar to the arbitration
clause at issue in Conseco, this arbitration clause permitted FirstMerit
Bank to seek judicial relief to enforce its security interest, recover the
de los Santoses' monetary loan obligation, and foreclose. 128  After
delivery of the mobile home, the de los Santoses tried to revoke
acceptance, claiming that the mobile home was defective and that
Verde had failed to make certain repairs. 129 Verde refused to rescind
the contract, and the de los Santoses stopped payments on the mobile
home. 3 '
The de los Santoses then filed suit against Verde Homes claiming
breach of contract, revocation of acceptance, breach of warranty,
negligence, and fraud. 3' The de los Santoses also claimed numerous
violations of various acts including the Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 3 2 The de los Santoses
122. 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001).
123. Id.




128. Id. The arbitration clause at issue required binding arbitration for "all disputes,
claims, or other matters in question arising out of or relating to this Loan, its interpretation,
validity, performance or the breach thereof." Id. The arbitration clause permitted the bank to
seek judicial relief to enforce its security interest, recover the buyers' monetary loan obligation,
and foreclose, but stated that "the scope of arbitrability is broad and includes, without limitation,
contractual, tort, statutory, and caselaw claims." Id.
129. Id. at 753.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. For the text of the Consumer Credit Protection Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
see 15 U.S.C. §1691 (1998). For the text of the Fair Debt Collection Act, see id. § 1692(f).
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requested an injunction to enforce their security interest. 133  In
response, FirstMerit Bank moved to stay the litigation and to compel
arbitration. 134  The trial court denied FirstMerit's motion to compel
arbitration. FirstMerit petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of
mandamus, which was denied. 3' FirstMerit then appealed to the
Texas Supreme Court.'36
The de los Santoses raised several defenses in the Texas Supreme
Court including unconscionability, duress, fraudulent inducement,
and revocation. 3 7 The court noted that Texas favors arbitration, and
that the burden was on the de los Santoses to prove that arbitration
was unconscionable because it was cost prohibitive. 38  Citing Green
Tree, the de los Santoses argued that the United States Supreme Court
had recognized that large arbitration fees could preclude a litigant
from vindicating his or her statutory rights. 39  The Texas Supreme
Court, however, noted that Green Tree neither indicated nor specified
"how detailed a showing of prohibited expense must be," but that
some specific information of future costs was required."' 40 Although
the de los Santoses had testified in sworn affidavits that the AAA
charged a minimum $2000 filing fee and a $250 per day/per party
hearing fee, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that it need not
decide whether the costs would be excessive because the de los
Santoses had provided no evidence that AAA would conduct the
arbitration or charge the fees.' Because the record contained no
specific evidence that the de los Santoses would be charged excessive
fees, the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show
that plaintiffs would be denied access to arbitration due to costs.
14 2
In contrast to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the Texas
Supreme Court in In re FirstMerit Bank would likely have sided with








141. Id. Notably, it makes little difference whether AAA or some other arbitration
organization would conduct the arbitration at issue because the AAA is the most widely used and
standardized arbitration organization. If the AAA were to conduct the arbitration in the de los
Santoses' case, the AAA's fees represent the low-end regarding fees of the various arbitration
organizations available. See [name of page of website], American Arbitration Association, at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1 .jsp?JSPssid=15769&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\RulesProcedur
es\Protocols\..\..\Resources\EduResources\consumer.protocol.htm (last visited March 1,
2004).
142. In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 757.
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the de los Santoses had they shown that the particular arbitrator of
their claims charged excessive fees."' However, the Texas Supreme
Court adopted a completely different approach from other
jurisdictions applying 'the cost prohibitive defense because it focused
solely on whether the fees for arbitration were excessive rather than
whether the costs borne by a plaintiff in relation to the income of that
plaintiff proved prohibitively costly.'44 Therefore, the Texas Supreme
Court looked at the arbitrator's fees, rather than a particular plaintiff's
means. 145  While this may produce some consistency, because
arbitrator's fees, at least in a particular area, may be similar, this
approach does not take into account a particular plaintiffs economic
means with regard to those fees.'46
C. Evidence Before Substance: Camacho v. Holiday Homes
In contrast to Conseco and In re FirstMerit Bank, other courts
have found that consumer plaintiffs have successfully shown that
arbitration is prohibitively costly. However, these courts have varied
in the amount of documentation and evidence necessary to prove
prohibitive costs.
In Camacho v. Holiday Homes, 4 7 Heidi Camacho purchased a
newly manufactured home in March 2000 for herself and her three
young children. 148 The contract was on a pre-printed form provided
by Holiday Homes.'49 The contract contained an arbitration clause
that made no mention of the costs of arbitration or which party would
be responsible for those costs."' Camacho sued Holiday Homes in





147. 167 F. Supp. 2d 892 (W.D. Va. 2001).
148. Id. at 893.
149. Id.
150. Id. The arbitration clause at issue provided:
Arbitration of Disputes and Waiver of Jury Trial: a. Dispute Resolution. Any
controversy or claim between or among you and me or our assignees arising out of or
relating to the Contract or any agreements or instruments relating to or delivered in
connection with this Contract, including any claim based on or arising from an alleged
tort, shall, if requested by either you or me, be determined by arbitration, reference,
or trial by judge as provided below.... YOU AND I AGREE AND
UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE GIVING UP THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY
JURY, AND THERE SHALL BE NO JURY WHETHER THE
CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM IS DECIDED BY ARBITRATION, BY
JUDICIAL REFERENCE, OR BY TRIAL BY A JUDGE.
Id. at 893.
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violations of the Virginia Uniform Commercial Code."'1 Camacho
filed her suit in forma pauperis, and the court exempted her from the
$150 filing fee." 2 Holiday Homes moved to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, or alternatively, to stay the proceedings and
compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause contained in the
contract.'5 3  Camacho opposed Holiday's motion to compel
arbitration, arguing that arbitration would prove unconscionable
because of the excessive fees and would essentially preclude her from
pursuing her claims." 4 Camacho's fees would include an initial filing
fee for arbitration of $1250 and a case fee of $750 before the case could
proceed to an evidentiary hearing.' 5 Attorney's fees would not be
reimbursed unless the initiating party prevailed before the arbitrator in
the final disposition of the case."5 6 Holiday argued that the arbitration
rules permitted the initiating party to apply for a waiver, reduction, or
deferral of arbitration fees, but the court found that, in practice,
complete waiver of fees was rarely granted. 7  Moreover, the
Commercial Arbitration Rules established that Camacho could not
proceed until she pays the arbitrator's fees and expenses and that each
party is responsible for those costs.' The arbitrator's fee and
expenses typically range between $100 and $300 per hour, for a
minimum of one full day, plus the arbitrator's additional preparation
and research time.'59 Camacho argued that the total amount of
arbitration to vindicate her claims would cost between $1200 and
$8000.160
Camacho presented substantial evidence, including lists of her
monthly expenses and income, indicating that the costs of arbitrating
her claims would preclude her from pursuing Holiday Homes. 6 This
evidence included a "declaration of her financial condition.'
62
Camacho's declaration stated that she provides sole support for herself
and her three children and earns an average weekly income of $300.163
She rarely received the $600 per year of child support to which she was
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entitled, and she attended a local community college part-time to earn
an associate degree in sociology.'64 Camacho also provided a
comprehensive list of her monthly expenses. 6 ' These expenses
included $60 to $75 for electricity, $20 for the telephone, $430 for
food, and various expenses for her daughter's drug prescriptions and
car payments.
166
After recognizing that Camacho was on a very limited income,
the court focused on two issues. 67 First, the court had to determine
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their claims.'68 In this case, the
court concluded that the parties agreed to arbitrate their claims,
notwithstanding the fact that Camacho argued that the initial sentence
in the arbitration clause providing that arbitration of any claim shall
be determined by arbitration "if requested by you or me," essentially
provided for elective arbitration.
69
Second, the court had to determine whether Camacho
"adequately demonstrated" that arbitration was financially
inaccessible to her. 70 The court compared Camacho's evidence of
financial inaccessibility with the evidence produced in Green Tree and
concluded that "in contrast to the plaintiff Randolph, Camacho has
presented substantial evidence that the costs of arbitrating her claims
would preclude her from vindicating her federal statutory rights.'
' 7'
In addition to producing evidence of her own income, Camacho also
produced detailed evidence that the arbitrator would cost between
$600 and $4100 for twenty-four hours and $1000 in travel fees and
expenses.'72 The court also recognized that Camacho was unable to
pay the $150 filing fee to initiate the claim the court considered.'
Consequently, the court concluded, "In view of these facts, the court
finds that Camacho's limited income affords no margin for expenses of
the magnitude required to pay an arbitrator to consider her claim. 1
74
In contrast to the Camacho court's significant evidentiary findings
with regard to the plaintiffs income and expenses, the Washington
164. Id.




169. Id. Camacho also argued that Holiday did not provide her with the opportunity to
read the contract prior to signing it. The court held, however, that "[tihe failure to provide such
an opportunity is of no consequence" because "[i]t is well settled that a party to a written
contract is responsible for 'informing herself of its contents before executing it."' Id. at 896.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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Court of Appeals did not require as significant a finding regarding
whether a plaintiff had shown that arbitration would prove
prohibitively costly. 7
Courts in the preceding cases developed a continuum of evidence
required to prove prohibitive costs and avoid mandatory arbitration in
favor of the judicial forum. These cases illuminate the difficulty in
identifying the type, quality, and amount of evidence required to
prove prohibitive costs. The court in Conseco v. Wilder found no
evidence that the Wilders could not afford arbitration unless the
Wilders proceeded through arbitration, returned to court, and proved
that it was too costly.176 The In re FirstMerit Bank court found the
evidence regarding prohibitive costs too speculative absent evidence of
a specific commercial arbitrator.' 77 In Camacho, the court found that
the plaintiff had successfully shown prohibitive costs by providing her
personal income and an arbitrator's average fees, although she clearly
did not need to show that a specific arbitrator would conduct the
arbitration at issue.178 In contrast, a Washington court has adopted
this defense without the evidentiary specificity of a plaintiffs
economic means as demonstrated by the Camacho plaintiff, or the
proof of a certain arbitrator that the court required in In re FirstMerit
Bank.
79
IV. THE COST PROHIBITIVE DEFENSE IN WASHINGTON:
MENDEZ V. PALM HARBOR HOMES
The Washington Court of Appeals addressed the validity of the
cost prohibitive defense for the first time in Mendez v. Palm Harbor
Homes. 8 ° In contrast to the Virginia District Court in Camacho, the
Washington Court of Appeals required a less detailed showing that
arbitration would prove prohibitively costly in order to invalidate an
arbitration clause in the consumer context.
Significantly, the court noted at the outset of the case that the
plaintiff, Wenceslao Mendez, did not complete high school, worked
two jobs to earn less than $20,000 annually, and supported a family of
five. 8' Mendez purchased a used mobile home for $12,000 from Palm
Harbor Homes at its dealership in Union Gap, Washington.'82 Palm
175. Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 111 Wash. App. 446,450,45 P.3d 594 (2002).
176. 47 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Ky. App. 2001).
177. 52 S.W.3d 749, 756-57 (Tex. 2001).
178. 167 F. Supp. 2d at 894-95.
179. 111 Wash. App. at 465, 45 P.3d at 605.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 450, 45 P.3d at 597.
182. Id.
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Harbor's preprinted sales contract contained the following arbitration
clause:
Arbitration and Disputes: Disputes arising out of this Agreement
are subject to compulsory and binding arbitration in accordance
with the following provisions and conditions:
(a) Enforcement. Upon the election and written demand by
either party showing the existence of a bona fide controversy and
to the full extent permitted by law, arbitration shall be the
exclusive procedure for resolving disputes and shall be binding
upon the parties. Arbitration shall be commenced and enforced
pursuant to [Revised Code of Washington] RCW 7.04 and
procedure shall be governed by the civil rules for superior courts
for the State of Washington and the evidentiary rules thereto.
The parties agree arbitration shall be by a three person panel:
one selected by each party and one selected by the two
arbitrators. Arbitration shall be held in Yakima County,
Washington.
(b) Scope of Arbitration. Arbitration shall extend to and the
arbitrators shall have the power to decide all matters and issues
of fact and/or law, including, but not limited to, the existence of
the validity of the Agreement as contract including the issue of
fraud and inducement or in its construction, performance or
breach and enforceability, operation or duration. The
arbitrators shall give full force and effect to all lawful terms of
the Agreement whether expressed or implied in fact. The
arbitrators shall further have power to decide the appropriate
remedies, including damages, restitution, awarding of interest,
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs of arbitration.
Arbitration shall not be binding on or extend to any lender or
other third party who has acquired rights arising out of any
financing or consumer credit contracts and/or security
agreements which may be a part or supplement the
Agreement. 183
Mendez also signed a separate arbitration agreement, providing
in relevant part:
The parties to the Retail Installment Contract or Cash Sale
Contract agree that any and all controversies or claims arising
out of, or in any way relating to, the Retail Installment Contract
or Cash Sale Contract or the negotiation, purchase, financing,
183. Id. at 450-51, 45 P.3d at 597-98. Note that this arbitration clause precludes a court
from adjudicating whether the clause or contract itself was fraudulently induced.
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installation, ownership, occupancy, habitation, manufacture,
warranties (express or implied), repair or sale/disposition of the
home which is the subject of the Retail Installation Contract or
Cash Sale Contract, whether those claims arise from or concern
contract, warranty, statutory, property or common law, will be
settled solely by means of final and binding arbitration before a
three-panel judge of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) in accordance with the rules and procedures of the AAA.
Judgment on the arbitration award may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction.
The parties agree that any contests to the validity or
enforceability of this Arbitration Provision ... will be
determined by arbitration in accordance with the terms of this
Arbitration Provision184
Subsequent to the formation of the contract to purchase the
mobile home, a dispute arose between the parties regarding payment
and delivery.18 1 Mendez filed a complaint for specific performance or
damages against Palm Harbor, alleging violations of the Dealers and
Manufacturers Act, RCW section 46.70, and the Consumer
Protection Act, RCW section 19.86.86 Palm Harbor relied on the
arbitration agreement to move to stay the proceeding and compel
arbitration under RCW section 7.04.87 In response, Mendez relied on
Green Tree and opposed the motion to stay the proceeding, arguing
that taking his claim to arbitration would be prohibitively costly.
88
Mendez also provided information from AAA, demonstrating that the
initial filing fee to submit his claim to arbitration would be $2000,
notwithstanding various other expenses associated with the
arbitration. 9 Palm Harbor argued that no Washington authority has
allowed an exception to RCW section 7.04 for people of limited
financial means.' 90
184. Id. at 451-52, 45 P.3d at 598. Notice that under Hurdle v. Fairbanks Capital Corp.,
No. 02-2788, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18357, at *20 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2002), a court may
hold that this clause represents a relationship between a borrower and a lender, and not a
consumer and lender. The AAA's Supplementary Procedures for Consumers likely would not
apply unless this provision expressly so stated, which it does not. Thus, if the Washington court
had stayed this litigation, Mr. Mendez likely would have been responsible for arbitration fees
under the commercial rules, a much more costly endeavor.
185. Mendez, 111 Wash. App. at 452, 45 P.3d at 598.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 452, 45 P.3d at 598.
189. Id. at 452, 45 P.3d at 598-99.
190. Id. at 453, 45 P.3d at 599.
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The trial court filed a memorandum opinion denying Palm
Harbor's motion to compel arbitration.'91 The trial court reasoned,
"invok[ing] either of the arbitration clauses would deprive the Plaintiff
of the opportunity for a hearing on his complaint.' 19 2 The trial court
further noted that Palm Harbor had failed to disclose the potential
financial burdens on Mendez regarding arbitration, stating, "the total
absence of disclosure of the financial burdens on the plaintiff" would
deny Mendez the informed choice regarding waiving his access to the
judicial forum.'93 Palm Harbor appealed the trial court's decision.194
On appeal, the court first addressed whether Mendez's claims
were subject to arbitration under RCW section 7.04, 9 U.S.C. § 10
(the FAA), or both. 9 ' The court noted that the settled law in
Washington is that Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and other
statutory claims are subject to arbitration under the FAA.'96
However, no controlling authority suggested whether state statutory
claims were generally arbitrable.'97 The court held that Mendez's
statutory claims were generally arbitrable under RCW section 7.04.198
The second question presented on appeal involved whether the
adhesion contract signed by Mendez was unconscionable.'99 Palm
Harbor conceded that the contract was adhesive.2 °0  The court
recognized that "adhesion contracts are not necessarily
unconscionable" but that ambiguities are construed against the
drafter.20' Noting that the lack of cost information in an arbitration
clause does not render the provision unenforceable, the court
approached a solution in equity.0 2 The court took note of the Green
Tree decision, and stated that it "highlights the crux of Mr. Mendez's
,access to justice' argument: the cost of arbitration is so high relative to
his financial condition and the small size of his primary claim ($1500)
that forcing AAA arbitration with three arbitrators effectively
precludes him from pursuing his claims against Palm Harbor.
20 3






196. Id. at 454, 45 P.3d at 599.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 454-57, 45 P.3d at 599-601.
199. Id. at 458, 45 P.3d at 601.
200. Id. at 459, 45 P.3d at 602.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 460, 45 P.3d at 602.
203. Id. at 461, 45 P.3d at 603.
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"antithesis" of access to justice because the $2000 filing cost
represented much less than the "thousands more" anticipated to
litigate Mendez's claims.24 Distinguishing the Green Tree plaintiff,
the court found that Mendez successfully shifted the burden to the
party seeking arbitration by showing the likelihood of incurring
prohibitive arbitration costs.
20 5
The Washington Court of Appeals stated: "Washington's policy
favoring arbitration is grounded on the proposition that arbitration
allows litigants to avoid the formalities, expense, and delays inherent
in the court system. 2 °6 According to the court, however, the policy
behind arbitration is defeated when an arbitration agreement triggers
prohibitive costs. 27  In finding prohibitive costs, the court relied on
the trial court's findings that (1) the arbitration would take a minimum
of $2000 to commence, (2) Mendez is poverty stricken without
practical means to arbitrate, and (3) Mendez agreed to arbitrate under
the "faulty premise" that arbitration would be less expensive and
burdensome to him than the judicial process. 0 8 Specifically, the court
recognized the "disparate commercial sophistication and unequal
financial footing between the parties. "209
In adopting this defense, the Washington Court of Appeals
provided some, but not enough, guidance. The court determined that
the level of review is abuse of discretion; that is, a trial court's decision
will not be reversed if it is on tenable grounds and for tenable
reasons. 21 This deferential standard of review allows a trial court
more latitude to determine whether a particular plaintiff successfully
proves prohibitive costs. 211  The defense "requires the trial judge to
consider the particular facts bearing upon equitable unconscionability
as well as legal unconscionability. 212  The court also would not
require precise calculation of the average cost to arbitrate a claim in
Washington because precise calculation is not possible without going
through arbitration.213
204. Id.
205. Id. at 462, 45 P.3d at 603.
206. Id. at 464, 45 P.3d at 604.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 466, 45 P.3d at 605.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id. But cf Conseco Financial Serv. Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Ky.
App. 2001) (disregarding the lower court's findings that the arbitration clause at issue was
oppressively one-sided and granting Conseco's motion to stay litigation and compel arbitration).
212. Mendez, 111 Wash. App. at 467, 45 P.3d at 606.
213. Id.
[Vol. 27:899
Cost Prohibitive Defense to Arbitration
In addressing Palm Harbor's arguments, the court noted that
Mendez failed to provide evidence allowing the reviewing court to
compare expected arbitration costs to expected litigation costs.
214
However, the court here relied on the fact that the filing fee for
arbitration is approximately twenty times higher than the filing fee for
a court action, which proved dispositive because Mendez would be
unable to even get his claim before an arbitrator at that amount.219
Palm Harbor also argued that Mendez could avoid AAA arbitration
costs by hardship provisions contained in AAA rules. 216 Refusing to
place Mendez at the mercy of the AAA, the court instead recognized
that the AAA rarely grants waivers and that such waivers are generally
unavailable until after the complaining party has "expended
considerable funds in arbitration.
217
The court next addressed whether the initial costs of arbitration
in Mendez's case were "prohibitive. ' 218  The court relied on the fact
that Palm Harbor conceded that even a $500 filing fee would likely be
"prohibitive" to Mendez in determining that the trial court's finding
as to Mendez's inability to pay is "unchallenged" and a "verity on
appeal. ,219
After the plaintiff established prohibitive costs, the court
determined that the opposing party must then present contrary
evidence to enforce arbitration.22' Because Palm Harbor did not
dispute Mendez's claim of being unable to afford the filing fee, did not
offer to defray the cost of arbitration pending the outcome, and did
not take steps "to limit the plaintiffs' costs of arbitration in a
meaningful fashion," Palm Harbor presented no offsetting evidence
that would allow enforcement of the arbitration agreement.
221
Consequently, in light of Mendez's prohibitive costs to arbitration,
and absent contrary evidence from Palm Harbor, Mendez was entitled
214. Id. at 468, 45 P.3d at 606.
215. Id.
216. Id. The Mendez court noted that although the court in In re FirstMerit Bank, 52
S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001), found the availability of a potential waiver persuasive, "other courts
have found such potential waivers unpersuasive because the AAA rarely grants them and they
are generally unavailable until after the complaining party has already expended considerable
funds in arbitration." Mendez, 111 Wash. App. at 468, 45 P.3d at 606. Consequently, unlike
the reasoning the Texas court employed in In re FirstMerit Bank, "Palm Harbor's argument on
this point is merely speculative." Id.
217. Mendez, 111 Wash. App. at 468,45 P.3d at 606; see also Camacho v. Holiday Homes,
Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (W.D. Va. 2001).
218. Mendez, 111 Wash. App. at 470, 45 P.3d at 607.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902,934-35 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
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to pursue his remedies in a judicial forum. 22 2 The Mendez decision is
fair because Mr. Mendez would not have been able to otherwise
pursue his claims in arbitration due to his limited means. While the
Wilder and In re First Merit Bank plaintiffs were unable to obtain a
judicial remedy because they were not able to prove prohibitive costs,
those plaintiffs were similarly economically situated to Mr. Mendez,
which suggests that courts are applying the cost prohibitive defense
differently in similar situations, violating horizontal equity.223
V. LIMITATIONS OF THE COST PROHIBITIVE DEFENSE AND
PROPOSALS FOR PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION COSTS
As discussed previously in this Note, Congress enacted the FAA
for a variety of reasons. First, the policy behind the Act was to
provide an efficient and cost-reducing method of resolving disputes.
The key prerequisite in this regard, however, was that the parties
agreeing to arbitrate disputes were on essentially equal footing in
terms of bargaining power. As the foregoing cases suggest,
commercial interests inappropriately rely on the FAA and unilateral
arbitration clauses to circumvent consumer rights. This use does not
coincide with congressional intent. 4 Second, arbitration had been
viewed with some reluctance by the courts as an ouster of their
jurisdiction to hear disputes. In response, Congress enacted the FAA
in order to place agreements to arbitrate on the same favored footing
as other contractual relationships. Perhaps because of the historical
increase in litigation, courts have viewed arbitration agreements not
with skepticism and scrutiny, but as a presumptive ouster of their
jurisdiction.22
Problems arise regarding agreements to arbitrate disputes with
the development of the adhesive contract whereby a consumer is
presented with terms on a "take it or leave it" basis.226 Commercial
entities soon realized that arbitration clauses were a valuable tool to
use in consumer contracts to avoid potentially large jury verdicts. As
222. Id. at 471, 45 P.3d at 607-08.
223. The term "horizontal equity" typically is applied to taxation considerations and
involves whether our tax system treats similarly situated taxpayers similarly. Michael J. Graetz
and Deborah H. Schenk, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 26 (Rev.
4th ed. 2002). 1 use the term here only to demonstrate that in the recent cases where courts
examine the cost prohibitive defense, similarly situated consumers are being treated differently.
224. See discussion infra note 16 and accompanying text.
225. See discussion infra note 15 and accompanying text.
226. See White, supra note 19, at 158. Arbitration agreements in consumer contracts do
control a "large quantity...of services." See id. As such, the argument that arbitration is more
efficient in the consumer context is seriously flawed.
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one author suggests, commercial entities use arbitration clauses as a
tool to prevent consumers from pursuing claims. 227 Thus, the use of
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts minimizes the potential
deterrent effect of large jury awards because commercial entities can
make defective products with little recourse in the courts. Without
the prospect of a jury, consumers are left little leverage to counteract
defective manufacturing or deceptive commercial financing practices.
This is not the only problem with adhesive arbitration agreements in
consumer contracts. Although the cost prohibitive defense attempts
to provide a meaningful remedy to those consumers of limited means,
it has likely created even more problems and uncertainties. The
following proposals may provide concrete remedies that the cost
prohibitive defense fails to address.
A. Adhere to the FAA's Legislative History and Purpose
Congress never intended that arbitration should be used in
merchant/consumer contracts.22' The legislative history on this point
is clear: members of Congress were specifically concerned that
arbitration clauses might be used to thwart consumers by means of
adhesive contracts.229 For this reason, courts should be reluctant to
favor arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and be more willing to
conclude that these clauses are unconscionable, whether or not
consumers prove that they do not have the money to pursue their
claims in arbitration. The judiciary's primary function is not to make
law; rather, the judiciary ought to interpret the law in light of
congressional intent and purpose. Congress enacted the FAA as a
method for parties with equal bargaining power to resolve disputes
with greater ease and efficiency and preserve commercial
relationships.23  Congress did not enact the FAA to permit
commercial entities to prey on unwitting consumers by selling
defective goods and precluding consumer claims by inserting
arbitration clauses under which a consumer cannot possibly afford to
adjudicate his or her claim.
227. Smith, supra note 22, at 1191.
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B. Equalize the Burden Between Consumers and Commercial Entities
The cost prohibitive defense places the burden solely on the
consumer to prove prohibitive arbitration costs. 231 Courts have treated
the consumer's burden very differently depending on the jurisdiction.
In Conseco, for example, the court apparently found that the Wilders'
potential prohibitive costs unpersuasive because they produced no
evidence that they could not afford the cost of arbitration.232 Despite
the fact that the Wilders' sole source of income was worker's
compensation payments, 233 the court concluded that this evidence was
insufficient to prove prohibitive costs prior to proceeding through
arbitration.234  The court suggested that if the arbitration clause at
issue in Conseco proved too costly in practice, the Wilders then might
be able to assert the defense.23 ' The burden on the Wilders was
significant because the Wilders would be required to expend their
limited financial resources to submit their claims to arbitration prior to
obtaining any assistance from the courts in asserting their claims
against Conseco.236
Similarly, in In re FirstMerit Bank, the court found that the de los
Santoses had not shown that arbitration would be prohibitively
costly.237 Although the de los Santoses had produced evidence of
AAA fees, the court found that the de los Santoses produced no
specific evidence that they would be charged those fees.238 Again, this
approach suggests that the de los Santoses would be required to
submit their claim to arbitration and proceed through that process
prior to bringing a claim that the fees charged were excessively
costly.239 Undoubtedly, the plaintiffs in these cases spent some money
initially litigating the arbitration clause at issue. Because the
respective courts deemed the arbitration clause valid, each plaintiffs
only available option was to pursue his or her claim in arbitration.
In contrast, the Camacho court found that the plaintiff had met
her burden of proving the prohibitive costs of arbitration by producing
significant evidence of her personal budget.24 Unlike In re FirstMerit
Bank, the Camacho court focused not on the fees likely to be charged a
231. See Mendez, 111 Wash. App. at 465, 45 P.3d at 605.
232. See Conseco, 47 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Ky. App. 2001).




237. 52 S.W.3d 749, 756-57 (Tex. 2001).
238. Id. at 756.
239. Id. at 756-57.
240. Camacho v. Holiday Homes, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 892, 895-97 (W.D. Va. 2001).
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particular plaintiff by a designated arbitrator,241' but rather on a
particular plaintiffs income and expenses.242  Consequently, the
Camacho plaintiff was not required to expend substantial money to go
through arbitration prior to bringing a claim that arbitration costs are
21excessive. 4 Instead, the plaintiff produced documentation regarding
her personal financial situation.244 Although requiring the plaintiff to
do anything in the face of a unilateral and unconscionable contract
seems suspect, the Camacho plaintiff at least had access to the
information she was required to produce.
However, the In re FirstMerit Bank plaintiff would be unlikely to
gain access to the total cost of arbitration because such information
necessarily requires the plaintiff to submit to arbitration. 245  The
Camacho and Mendez approaches are better in this respect because
those courts concluded that the evidence required to assert the defense
was the type of evidence to which a plaintiff likely has access.
Furthermore, the Camacho court provided at least some guidance for
future litigants, stating that Camacho had produced "substantial
evidence" that arbitrating her claims would preclude her from
pursuing her statutory rights.246 Plaintiffs seeking to successfully
241. In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 756.
242. Camacho, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. Costs to arbitrate a claim under the AAA vary according to the plaintiffs location, the
number of days the arbitrator requires to hear the dispute, travel and preparation costs, and
initial filing fees. Any estimate of a "typical" arbitration would depend upon the nature and
complexity of the claim and the experience of the arbitrator. Also, although the AAA has
established the Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related disputes, which restrict the
amount a consumer must pay to arbitrate a dispute with a business, at least one court has held
that the relationship between a consumer and a refinancing institution is one of "a borrower and
a lender, and not of a consumer and a business [and therefore] the Supplementary Procedures do
not apply in this instance." Hurdle v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., No. 02-2788, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18357, at *20 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2002) (holding that plaintiff proved prohibitive
costs based upon her financial condition and absent proof of a particular arbitrator's fees). This
is significant because the Commercial Procedures for AAA do not have similar consumer
protections to minimize fees. See AAA's Supplementary Rules for Consumer Related Disputes,
available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=1547&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules
Procedures\NationalInternational\..\..\focusArea\consumer\AAA236current.htm (last visited
March 1, 2004). The Hurdle decision suggests that unless a commercial interest explicitly
provides that the AAA's consumer Supplementary Procedures apply, arbitration between a
consumer and a refinancing institution likely will be conducted under the AAA's commercial
rules. Hurdle, 2002 LEXIS 18357, at *20 n.3. The commercial rules do not restrict the amount a
consumer must pay.
246. Camacho, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
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assert this defense would be wise to produce documentation of both
the arbitrator's potential fees, and their personal financial situation in
order to prevail. At least in West Virginia, such documentation likely
would constitute substantial evidence of the economic unavailability of
arbitration.
C. Address the Inherent Unfairness in Unilateral Arbitration Agreements
Another significant issue with the cost prohibitive defense is that
it fails to address the inherent unfairness in forcing arbitration on
consumers in adhesive contracts. This problem becomes especially
apparent when the commercial interest retains the right to use both
judicial and non-judicial remedies, yet leaves the consumer with
arbitration as his or her only remedy. The practical effect of these
unilateral arbitration clauses is that the commercial entity retains the
ability to seek judicial relief to repossess the goods and obtain a
deficiency judgment against the consumer. At least in the context of
the mobile home cases, a repossession and deficiency judgment likely
means that the consumer not only loses his or her home, but also
forfeits any down payment and monthly payments to the commercial
entity. Rather than providing the cost prohibitive defense in some
contexts, courts should invalidate these unilateral arbitration clauses as
unconscionable. This would allow consumers to seek immediate
judicial relief for claims and allow commercial interests to seek
immediate judicial relief to protect their security interests. Even if the
contract contained unfair provisions at formation because of the
unilateral arbitration clause, invalidating unilateral or otherwise
unconscionable arbitration clauses would at least provide equitable
remedies to both parties.247
In these cases, arbitration cannot possibly be the best answer to
the overburdened judicial system because the commercial interests,
particularly in the consumer context, usually retain the unilateral right
to use a judicial remedy against the consumer. Thus, the commercial
entity clearly continues to burden the judicial forum by bringing its
247. As this article was scheduled for press, Marissa Dawn Lawson of The University of
Texas Law School published an interesting article proposing that courts should hold "binding
arbitration clauses prima facie unconscionable." Marissa Dawn Lawson, Judicial Economy at
What Cost: An Argument for Finding Binding Arbitration Clauses Prima Facie Unconscionable, 23
REV. LITIG. 463, 465 (2004). 1 am not arguing here for prima facie unconscionability; rather, I
propose that courts should truly consider the realities of the parties' relative bargaining power
and how and why commercial entities use these clauses. In many consumer cases, particularly
the ones that I have described, the cost prohibitive defense misses the point because the clauses
examined here are likely unconscionable outright, especially considering their unilateral nature,
regardless of whether the consumer affirmatively proves that arbitration costs are in fact
prohibitive. This was certainly the case in Conseco.
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claims against the consumer in court, and any efficiency gained by
mandatory arbitration significantly decreases. The best solution
would be to allow the consumer also to bring claims against the
commercial interest in the judicial forum if the commercial interest
itself chooses that remedy. This solution would place parties
previously on unequal footing at contract formation on equal footing
for remedial purposes.
One commentator suggests that courts should not construe a
contract to prefer arbitration any more than they should interpret
ambiguities in favor of banks or insurance companies:
If parties want pink elephants to proliferate, they may so
contract, but the court should interpret ambiguous contracts
either evenhandedly or against the interest of the drafting party.
Congress [has] never authorized the Court to put its thumb on
the scale to favor arbitration in the commercial or consumer
context, and such bias also lacks support as a matter of policy.24
With the development of other equitable contractual remedies
such as promissory estoppel, courts have recognized that the sanctity
of contractual relationships must be tempered249 if public policy so
requires. Courts should interpret agreements to arbitrate similarly.
Courts should not adopt a defense to a binding arbitration agreement
that is procedural in form and substantive in function in the consumer
context; rather, courts should be more willing to apply traditional
contract theories, such as unconscionability, to void contracts where
one party had no reason to know of his or her obligations under the
contract, and where the risk allocation in the contract is substantively
unfair.
248. Sternlight, supra note 23, at 705 (emphasis added).
249. Grant Gilmore remarked that classical contract theory is being "reabsorbed" into tort
by virtue of equitable developments such as promissory estoppel. GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 96 (Ronald K.L. Collins, ed., 1995). He posits that we are approaching a
point where "there is really no viable distinction between liability in contract and liability in
tort," and that the two areas are "gradually merging and becoming one." Id. At least in these
cases, the courts' reluctance to invalidate arbitration agreements in consumer- merchant
situations as unconscionable appears to fully embrace laissez-faire economics and thus illustrates
that the sanctity of contract and contractual relationships still prevails in some measure. For an
interesting discussion on this move from "sanctity" to "fairness," see generally K.M. Sharma,
From "Sanctity" to "Fairness": An Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 95 (1999).
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D. Require Commercial Entities to Use the AAA 's Consumer Protocol in
Consumer Contracts
In Hurdle, the court held that the AAA's Consumer Protocol did
not apply to a contract between a borrower and a refinancing
institution because that relationship constituted one of "borrower and
lender," not one of consumer and merchant."' This decision suggests
that unless a commercial interest explicitly provides that the AAA's
Consumer Protocol, which limits the monetary responsibility of a
consumer in arbitration, applies to the contract, courts will construe
the arbitration provision to require a commercial procedure.
Commercial procedures do not shift fees to the commercial
interest and restrict the amount the consumer must pay to submit his
or her claim to arbitration. For this reason, and to increase its bottom
line, a commercial entity is unlikely to expressly include a provision in
its arbitration clause that provides for disputes to be resolved under
any Consumer Protocol unless forced to do so by a state legislature as
a matter of public policy.
In order to avoid the issue of prohibitive costs altogether, state
legislatures should require commercial entities to permit consumers to
use the consumer protocols available under many professional
arbitration associations. The practical effect of such legislation would
be three-fold. First, it would provide an incentive to properly
manufacture and finance goods for retail sale because the
manufacturers, dealers, and financing institutions would be liable for
the bulk of the costs if a consumer claim proceeds to arbitration and
the consumer prevails. Second, it would minimize the potential
unconscionability of unilateral arbitration agreements because the
consumer would not be forced to forego a judicial remedy in favor of a
more costly method to pursue his or her claims. Finally, such a rule
would promote efficiency because it would retain the benefits of
arbitration, without prohibitive costs: it would further those policies
that arbitration was intended to address-judicial inefficiency and
significant case loads-while at the same time preserving arbitration as
a comparable forum to litigation.
Without legislation protecting a consumer from commercial
arbitration rates, which can be extremely burdensome if not
economically out of reach, the AAA's Consumer Protocol is nothing
more than an illusory promise that arbitration is indeed less expensive
than litigation, which the commercial entity can avoid simply by
contract. Moreover, consumers are not likely well versed in
250. 2002 LEXIS 18357, at *20 n.3.
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arbitration protocols and rules to know that a commercial arbitration
will be significantly more expensive than consumer arbitration and to
be able to bargain for the use of a Consumer Protocol. Because
commercial entities will be more likely to have this knowledge, the
legislature should allocate this risk to the commercial entity, not the
consumer. Arbitration and litigation should be about choice, and the
misuse of arbitration by some commercial entities has fundamentally
taken away consumer choice. It is time for legislatures and courts to
restore the ability for consumers to choose their forum and allow this
fundamental check on our free-market economy to function
unimpaired.
VI. CONCLUSION
The cost prohibitive defense relies on several assumptions that
are plainly unjustified in light of how commercial entities use
arbitration in the consumer context. The first assumption involves
arbitration as a comparable forum to litigation. The crux of the issue
is that the FAA was enacted as a philosophical alternative to litigation.
However, the FAA and its subsequent application by courts to
consumer contracts, assumes too much. It assumes that the allocation
of risk for non-performance of a contract is evenly apportioned. It
assumes that a contract is not adhesive or unconscionable. It assumes
that an arbitration clause, which provides for an alternative forum to
resolve disputes about the contract, is not adhesive or unconscionable.
It assumes that an arbitration clause is procedural, not substantive. As
a result, when both the contract and the arbitration clause are adhesive
and unconscionable, as is often the case in today's consumer
transactions, the practical effect is to reapportion the contractual risks
to ensure that the consumer bears the entire burden in these
transactions. This shift is particularly egregious in those
unconscionable and adhesive arbitration clauses where the commercial
entity blatantly retains all of its judicial remedies.
Similarly, the cost prohibitive defense also is procedural because
it interposes an evidentiary hearing requirement on the consumer
before reaching the substantive issues of adhesion and
unconscionability in the arbitration clause itself.251 However, any
251. See Sternlight, supra note 23, at 705. Ms. Sternlight suggests that arbitration clauses
function procedurally, but provide substantive outcomes. The cost prohibitive defense has the
exact same function because, in many cases, a failure by the consumer to demonstrate the precise
costs of arbitration will allow a court to stay litigation for the consumer's claims and compel
arbitration. This outcome is substantive because a consumer may be forced to proceed in
arbitration-a remedy that many, like the hypothetical Turner family, would be unable to afford
on even a modest income under common commercial arbitration protocols.
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failure by the consumer to produce the type, amount, or quality of
evidence regarding prohibitive costs produces a substantive result in
that the consumer often is prevented financially from bringing his or
her claim. The unfortunate result is that the consumer, who wants to
remain in the judicial forum to assert traditional and modern remedies
such as consumer protection act claims against a commercial entity for
breach of the underlying contract, simply cannot argue that the
substantive provisions of an arbitration clause are adhesive and
unconscionable. Instead, the consumer must carefully and clearly
respond to this new court-imposed procedural requirement of "show
me the money" that he or she does not have.
This is not to say that arbitration does not have the capacity to
adequately resolve the problems with the judicial system, particularly
with regard to efficiency and expense. However, if the benefits of
arbitration are to be realized, legislators must create, and courts must
enforce, certain protections so that arbitration may not be continually
misused against consumers. As I have suggested, such protections
may well include invalidating unilateral arbitration clauses, requiring
that the Consumer Protocol and its fee-shifting provisions apply to all
commercial-consumer contracts, recognizing that the relationship
between a consumer and a lender, dealer, or manufacturer is not a
commercial relationship, and invalidating as unconscionable those
arbitration provisions that may preclude a consumer from asserting
statutory claims even if the consumer has not proven the particular
costs of his or her arbitration. Consumer protection requires our
legislatures and courts to do nothing less, and the cost prohibitive
defense will not provide the broad-based reforms that these problems
warrant.
[Vol. 27:899
